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ABSTRACT
The paper argues that the market significantly overvalues firms with severely underfunded pen-
sion plans. These companies earn lower stock returns than firms with healthier pension plans
for at least five years after the first emergence of the underfunding. The low returns are not
explained by risk, price momentum, earnings momentum, or accruals. Further, the evidence
suggests that investors do not anticipate the impact of the pension liability on future earnings,
and they are surprised when the negative implications of underfunding ultimately material-
ize. Finally, underfunded firms have poor operating performance, and they earn low returns,
although they are value companies.
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The combination of a deep bear stock market and a sharp fall in interest rates during the period
2000 to 2002 has resulted in a $400 billion deterioration of the funding status of defined benefit
(DB) pension plans in the U.S. The gravity of this phenomenon is such that the research divisions of
several investment firms started the calendar year 2003 with a report on corporate pension funding
and accounting. As one might expect, the main theme of these reports is whether or not current
market valuations correctly reflect this liability and its implicatons for future corporate cash flows.1
The correct valuation of the corporate pension liability does not concern only stock market
efficiency; indeed it has macroeconomic implications. Unlike continental Europe and Japan, the
U.S. pension system has shifted most of the burden of providing income for people’s retirement
from the public to the private sector. In particular, the U.S. system is special in its heavy reliance
on pension plans in which companies, rather than individuals or the public sector, bear all the
responsibility of the provision of funding for employee retirement. Although economists and the
media have mostly focused on the serious dangers that public pension systems currently face, such
as the increase in longevity and the fall in birth rates, we cannot take for granted that the U.S.
private pension system does not face problems. At the heart of the viability and the efficiency
of the U.S. system is the correct pricing of companies, so that the flow of savings into corporate
securities is not distorted and efficient levels of corporate investment in capital and employment
are obtained. The relationship between corporate pension provision and economic efficiency is
described in Bulow, Morck, and Summers (1987):
The question of how the stock market values pension assets and liabilities is of
central importance to corporate decision makers, financial economists and economists
concerned with [the] level of national savings. If investors treat pension debt different
from other forms of debt, in valuing firms, prudent value maximizing managers should
recognize these differences and adjust their pension funding policies accordingly. A
convincing demonstration that market valuations failed to take account of pension assets
or liabilities would either challenge prevailing theories of market efficiency and rational
valuation, or force a re-examination of conventional views about effective ownership
of pension claims. Finally, if potential beneficiaries of pensions recognized the value
of the pensions and adjusted their savings accordingly, but no comparable adjustment
occurred because holders of pension liabilities did not recognize their liabilities [...], then
pensions would reduce national savings.
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This article finds evidence of significant overvaluation for companies with large deficits in their
DB pension plans. When we sort companies into portfolios on the basis of the funding level of
their pension plan, the decile portfolio of most underfunded companies earns lower returns than
portfolios of firms with healthier pension plans. Adjusting for risk makes the gap even larger,
as severely underfunded firms have relatively high loadings on the three Fama and French (1993)
factors. The estimated underperformance for the most underfunded portfolio with respect to the
three-factor model can be as large as 10.6% annually. The returns are persistently low for at least
five years after the emergence of underfunding.
Using time-series and cross-sectional tests, and relying on other descriptive evidence, we con-
clude that this finding is not the effect of known asset pricing anomalies such as price momentum
(Jegadeesh and Titman (1993)), earnings momentum (Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok (1996)),
or accruals (Sloan (1996)). Instead, as we explain below, we believe the overvaluation follows from
the fact that investors do not take into account the negative implications of pension plan under-
funding for future earnings and cash flows until they actually materialize in the income statement.
Consistent with this interpretation, we provide significant evidence that the market is negatively
surprised by the low earnings of underfunded firms.
By looking at several measures of operating and financial performance, we characterize the
most underfunded companies as poor performers. This fact, along with the evidence that they
have high book-to-market (B/M) ratios, characterizes the mispricing that identify in this paper as
an anomaly that is inherently different from the “value vs. growth puzzle.” Severely underfunded
companies are poor past performers, which, unlike other high B/M firms, seem to be overvalued.
We believe that the implications of this result for the debate on the nature of the value premium
are far-reaching.
In a DB pension plan, the assets are represented by the contributions made by the sponsoring
firm over the life of the plan. As these contributions are normally invested in traded assets, they
are valued at their market prices. The liability of a pension plan is the discounted value of all future
pension obligations. The discount rate is chosen by the company and it is related to the level of
interest rates. A pension plan underfunding occurs when the value of liabilities exceeds the value
of assets. It can materialize as a consequence of a decline in the market value of pension assets,
of a decrease of the rate at which future obligations are discounted, or simply because the value
of new contributions is not enough to cover new obligations. In any case, the deficit in the plan
represents a true liability for the sponsoring company both in economic and accounting terms, as
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it has to appear on the balance sheet.2
There are two main channels through which pension liabilities affect earnings and cash flows.
First, according to accounting regulations, if a loss emerges in a pension plan as a consequence of
reduced assets or increased liabilities and the loss is larger than 10% of the maximum between the
two items, then the company is obliged to amortize the loss starting from the next fiscal year.3
This amortization decreases earnings of firms with severely underfunded plans. Cash flows are also
reduced if at the same time the company makes a financial contribution to the plan. Secondly,
the Employee Retirement Income Act (ERISA) of 1974, which protects workers’ interests in the
solvency of the plan, imposes a mandatory contribution if the plan is severely underfunded.4 In
this case, the sponsoring company is required to make up the deficit within three to five years of
its emergence. Overall, the institutional environment causes large pension liabilities to ultimately
affect earnings and cash flows. The crucial point is that this impact may not be immediate, but it
can be delayed to the year following the first emergence, and can hit earnings and cash flows even
five years later. Also important, the discretion with which the firm may decided both the amount
of the amortization and the contributions to the plan, along with the intricate set of accounting
and fiscal regulations, make the impact of the pension liability difficult to assess ex ante.
In our view, these institutional features play a major role in the emergence of the overvaluation
of underfunded firms and the subsequent negative earnings surprises and price adjustments. The
reason behind the overvaluation is that investors do not fully incorporate into prices the negative
impact of a large pension liability on future earnings and cash flows. When the pension liability
starts to affect earnings and cash flows, the market appears to be negatively surprised. In this sense,
the evidence of low returns for companies with high past underfunding would be a manifestation
of the price adjustment that follows the negative surprises. Moreover, the fact that the impact
of a large pension underfunding on earnings and cash flows can manifest up to five years after its
occurrence would explain why returns are persistently low for a number of years.
We provide abundant evidence in support of this interpretation. First, several indicators sug-
gest that a negative earnings surprise can be predicted for companies with large past underfunding.
We find that these firms have negative raw and risk-adjusted returns around future earnings an-
nouncements, negative standardized unexpected earnings (SUE), and downward revisions in analyst
forecasts of earnings. Secondly, earnings and cash flows deteriorate in the year after the emergence
of a large underfunding, and this phenomenon is not accompanied by a decrease in the growth rate
of sales. In other words, there are factors outside the normal operations of the firm that cause the
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poor economic result. We believe that these factors are the amortization of the pension loss and
the contributions to the plan.
On the other hand, there is no evidence of a symmetric effect for firms with overfunded pension
plans. This is not surprising and can be explained on the basis of existing theories of manager
short-termism (see, for example, Stein (1989)). Since the firm can use the overfunding to increase
current earnings and cash flows, it is likely that there is no delay between the materialization of
the overfunding and its positive impact on the economic performance of the firm.
A priori, we can identify a number of factors that potentially magnify the mispricing related to
a given level of underfunding. First, and most obvious, a given dollar amount of pension liability
has different relevance depending on the potential of a company to generate future cash flows that
are needed to cover the shortfall in the pension plan. Since market value is related to future cash
flows, the same amount of underfunding should have less importance for a larger company. Second,
if indeed the market does not pay enough attention to pension information, the mispricing is likely
to emerge among those companies for which there is less information diffusion, that is, smaller
companies. Finally, the same percentage decline in cash flows can have a larger impact on the
market value of a firm that relies more heavily on cash flows to finance projects with positive net
present value (NPV). In other words, credit constraints can magnify the price impact of a given
surprise in earnings. In this sense, the most likely candidates for a large mispricing are small firms
and distressed firms because companies in these two categories are known to have more binding
credit constraints.
These considerations are relevant when constructing an index of pension plan funding level.
In particular, the arguments in the previous paragraph suggest that the appropriate variable for
scaling the dollar amount of pension liability is market value. Market capitalization is correlated
with a firm’s future cash flows, information diffusion (for example, through analyst coverage), and
credit constraints. For this reason, the measure of funding status that we choose is the difference
between assets and liabilities in the pension plan, scaled by the firm’s market capitalization. The
main results in the paper are obtained using this sorting variable.
It is reassuring, however, to find evidence of mispricing also when the scaling variable in the
index of funding status is total assets. The fact that the magnitudes are somewhat smaller with this
alternative measure corroborates the view that scaling by market capitalization selects the most
likely candidates for mispricing. In particular, we argue that some highly levered, and presumably
financially distressed, firms drop out of the extreme portfolios if the scaling variable is total assets.
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In our view, the magnifying effect of credit constraints is stronger when market capitalization is in
the denominator rather than total assets.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section I draws the link between this work and
previous literature. Section II defines and summarizes the pension plan variables that are relevant
for our analysis. Section III documents the fact that the most underfunded firms earn lower raw
returns, and have a discount in their risk-adjusted returns. Section IV provides support for our
interpretation of the mispricing by looking at several measures of earnings surprises. Section V
characterizes the firms in our portfolios on the basis of their operating and financial performance.
Section VI verifies that the observed mispricing is not absorbed by other known asset pricing
anomalies in a cross-sectional framework. Also, Section VI presents robustness checks in which
similar evidence is obtained using an alternative measure of funding status, and the results are
articulated by size groups. Finally, Section VII proposes some insight for regulators and draws the
conclusions of this work.
I. Relation to Previous Literature
This paper relates to two main strands of the literature. On the one hand, there is the work
concerned with asset pricing anomalies. On the other hand, our paper addresses the old issue of
the efficient valuation of pension liabilities, which is relevant from the point of view of corporate
finance, public finance, and macroeconomics.
In terms of asset pricing, we believe the mispricing we find is similar in nature to other anomalies
explored in the literature, such as the post-earnings-announcement drift (PEAD), first reported in
Ball and Brown (1968) and later corroborated by Bernard and Thomas (1990), and the accrual
anomaly described by Sloan (1996) and more recently by Chan, Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok
(2004). In Bernard and Thomas’ (1990) explanation of the PEAD, investors do not anticipate
the fact that quarterly earnings are autocorrelated, so they are systematically surprised when high
earnings in one quarter are followed by high earnings in the next quarters. Sloan (1996) documents
a negative relation between accruals, the difference between earnings and cash flows, and future
returns, and argues that the market does not anticipate the fact that the accrual component of
earnings will revert.
These anomalies, like the one we document, seem to depend on the failure of investors to
fully exploit publicly available information. In particular, there is information in a firm’s financial
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statements that has implications for future earnings, but which is not impounded into prices until
the impact on future earnings finally manifests. The component of the mispricing that we identify
relates to the fact that the neglected information concerns a liability of the company, rather than the
quality of current earnings. The explanation we propose for our result is in line with the observation
in Chan, Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok (2004) that the market fixates on bottom-line earnings
and neglects other relevant information, which in this case is pension plan funding.
The results in Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok (1996) and Hong, Lim, and Stein (2000) are also
consistent with our findings. In connection with momentum, they suggest that the market slowly
impounds earnings news into prices, with negative information taking even longer to spread in the
market. Our evidence of persistently lower returns for severely underfunded firms also suggests
that bad news, that is, pension plan underfunding, takes more time to be fully incorporated into
prices.
A final issue regarding asset pricing is that the results obtained in this paper are also relevant
to the debate on the value premium. In particular, underfunded companies display poor past
operating performance and high book-to-market ratios. Unlike other value firms, however, they
are overvalued rather than undervalued. The immediate implication is that the value premium can
be magnified by excluding underfunded firms from the value portfolios. Also, it seems that the
belief that firms with poor past performance are generally undervalued needs to be at least in part
reconsidered.
In terms of the valuation of the pension liability, the evidence that we present in this paper
seems to be in sharp contrast with the conclusions of earlier work (Feldstein and Seligman (1981),
Feldstein and Morck (1983), Bulow, Morck and Summers (1987)). These studies conclude that the
market takes into account pension liabilities when valuing a company, and that the valuation is
correct.
Besides the fact that we use a much longer and more recent sample, there are other ways to
interpret the difference between our results and those of these previous studies. The methodology of
this earlier literature consists of regressing market value on its possible determinants, as suggested
by either a Tobin’s Q model or a discounted cash flow model. Among the determinants, these
authors use the funding status of DB pension plans. Taking into account taxes and other issues,
the theory suggests that a one-dollar increase in pension plan funding should increase the market
value of the company by about one dollar.5 Since the hypothesis of a coefficient on pension plan
funding equal to one cannot be rejected, these studies conclude that the market correctly evaluates
6
the pension plan funding status. In fact, given the size of their standard errors, a coefficient
smaller than one cannot be excluded either, and thus our evidence of overvaluation would not be
rejected in the context of those studies. More generally, the approach followed by this literature
does not allow one to draw inferences on the efficiency of market valuation because the omission
and mismeasurement of relevant determinants of company value, as well as the endogeneity of the
funding status, are bound to bias the coefficient on the funding status.
Our methodology, which is more typical of asset pricing studies, circumvents these issues as
it investigates the determinants of expected returns, rather than of market value. In particular,
to draw our inference of mispricing we rely on deviations of the measured average returns from
the expected return predicted by a factor pricing model. Obviously, our conclusion of inefficient
market valuation is contingent on having chosen the correct asset pricing model (joint hypothesis
problem, Fama (1970)). However, we also provide evidence of significant market surprises around
earnings announcements. As argued by Fama (1991), given the short window around which returns
are measured in an event study, the asset pricing model chosen as a benchmark is less relevant, and
we can get as close as possible to a pure test of the efficient market hypothesis.
II. The Pension Plan Data
A. Variable Definitions
We obtain the accounting items related to defined benefit (DB) pension plans from Compustat.
The variables of interest correspond to different accounting items over the years, and are initially
available in 1980. In particular, we use accounting data to construct the equivalent of two pension
plan elements, namely the fair value of plan assets (FVPA) and the projected benefit obligation
(PBO). In Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 87 (SFAS 87) these two items are
defined as follows:
• The FVPA represents the market value of the assets (stocks, bonds, and other investments)
that are set aside and restricted (usually in a trust) to pay benefits when due. Plan as-
sets include amounts contributed by the employer plus amounts earned from investing the
contributions, less benefits paid.
• The PBO represents the actuarial present value of vested and nonvested benefits earned by an
employee for service rendered to date plus projected benefits attributable to salary increases.
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The amount of benefits is determined by the plan’s pension benefit formula, which establishes
the payments that participants are entitled to receive. The measurement of the accumulated
benefit obligation is based on current and past compensation levels. To compute the PBO the
company makes an assumption on the expected increase in salaries for the employees covered
by the plan, and computes the benefits that result from the salary increase using the benefit
formula.
For accounting purposes, and in the rest of the paper, a pension plan is defined to be overfunded
(underfunded) if the FVPA is larger (smaller) than the PBO. A company can sponsor both over-
funded and underfunded pension plans. In the Appendix, we describe in detail the construction of
the FVPA and PBO series from the available accounting items. The two series range from 1980 to
2002.
The definition of the variable we use to capture a firm’s funding status deserves a separate
discussion. We are interested in the eventual impact of the funding level of the pension plan on
firm value through its impact on earnings and cash flows. Obviously, the same dollar amount of
underfunding has different implications for these variables depending on the size of the company.
Therefore, the difference between the FVPA and the PBO needs to be appropriately normalized.
Given the discussion in the introduction, there are several reasons to expect that the mispricing
that originates from underfunding is magnified by a factor that is inversely related to size. Hence,
we choose to divide the difference between the FVPA and the PBO by market capitalization in
December of the calendar year in which the pension items are measured, and we denote this variable
as the funding ratio (FR). The variable FR is then defined as
FR =
FV PA− PBO
Mkt Cap
. (1)
A relevant criticism to normalization by market value is that this ratio could capture effects
that are related to the company’s book-to-market (B/M) ratio. In particular, for companies with
positive FR, a higher level of FR could correspond to a higher B/M ratio, without necessarily
implying a better funding status.6 So, companies with high (and positive) FR could earn high
returns just because they are value firms. This argument is similar in spirit to the point made by
Berk (1995), who suggests that using a price multiple as a sorting variable mechanically induces a
relation with expected returns, and therefore with average returns.
As will be evident further on, by focusing on underfunded firms, our research design effectively
circumvents this problem. By an argument similar to the one just above, a very negative FR could
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hide a high B/M ratio. Accordingly, a stock with very low and negative FR should earn high
returns, as it signals a value company. Given that we find that highly underfunded companies earn
low returns, the value effect is not possibly what drives our results.
An alternative research design would be to normalize the same numerator by an accounting
variable such as total assets or book value. In Section VI, we present results that use total assets
as the denominator. Scaling by total assets removes from the most underfunded portfolio those
companies that are most likely to be mispriced. This argument is discussed in more detail in
Section VI.
B. Overview of Pension Plan Elements
It is interesting to look at the historical evolution of pension plan funding for companies with DB
plans. Figure 1 reports the time series of the aggregate funding level for all the companies in Com-
pustat with available pension items. The funding level is the difference between aggregate assets
and PBO. As is evident from Figure 1, the DB pension system displays an aggregate underfunding
for the first time in our sample in the years between 1993 and 1995. Concurrent with the bull
market of the second half of the 1990s, pension plan assets grew more than benefits, peaked in
2000 at almost $1.8 trillion. The contemporaneous slight decrease in aggregate benefits caused the
aggregate funding level to peak in fiscal year 1999 with an aggregate overfunding of about $262
billion. In the years between 2000 and 2002, the decline in the stock market caused a 20% fall in
the value of pension plan assets, which culminated in fiscal year 2002 in an aggregate underfunding
of almost $380 billion. This astonishing deficit in DB pension plans is at the root of the concerns
about the health of the DB pension system among analysts and regulators. FIGURE 1
HEREFor the purpose of our asset pricing tests, we use accounting data up to the year 2002. The
companies included in our empirical analysis have to satisfy a number of selection criteria. The
criteria that we discuss in this section are common to all types of analysis that we perform in the
paper. From the Center for Research on Security Prices (CRSP) monthly data set we select only
NYSE, Amex, and NASDAQ firms with ordinary common equity. Therefore, we exclude ADRs,
REITs, and units of beneficial interest. Moreover, to correct for the survival bias induced by the
way Compustat adds firms to its tapes (Banz and Breen (1986)), we do not include companies until
they have at least two years of accounting data. We also restrict our analysis to companies that
sponsor DB pension plans, which we identify as having available data for the pension accounting
items that we describe above. Finally, to correct for the effect of outliers, we drop observations for
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each year in which the FR variable is more than five standard deviations away from the annual
mean.
There are 36,651 company-years in the sample between 1980 and 2002 that result from the
intersection of these requirements. The year with the minimum (maximum) number of firms is
2001 (1981) with 1,213 (1,883) companies. Table I presents summary statistics on the main pension
items and the FR for these companies. TABLE I
HEREThe average PBO in the whole sample is about $440 million, which corresponds to about 91%
of the FVPA in the same period. The average funding level, as measured by FR, is about 1%, the
same as the median. This figure results from combining highly overfunded and highly underfunded
companies. The minimum FR is -987%, while the maximum is 572%. The performance of the
stock market affects the evolution of the funding status of companies with a DB pension plan as,
on average, about 60% of the plan assets are invested in stocks.7 The funding status has been
deteriorating over time, as liabilities have grown at a faster pace than assets. The average assets in
a plan grew by about 2.7 times in the 1991 to 2002 sample relative to the previous decade, while
the average pension obligation grew more than proportionally (2.96 times). This evolution caused
the average FR to drop from 2% to -1%.
III. Portfolio Analysis
In this section we sort firms into portfolios according to the level of FR. We form eleven port-
folios. The first ten portfolios contain only underfunded firms (FR<0) in a given year, while the
eleventh portfolio is composed of all overfunded firms (FR≥0), which we include in the analysis as
a benchmark and for completeness.
Notice that because our main focus is on companies with negative FR, we avoid the problem
mentioned in Section II concerning the possible relation between the level of FR and the discount
rate applied to the cash flows of these firms. Given that market value is the denominator, companies
with very low and negative FR are more likely to have high expected returns. Hence, our finding of
low returns for highly underfunded companies is not likely to be explained by a mechanical relation
between FR and the discount rate.
We examine the performance of these portfolios at different horizons after portfolio formation
by looking at raw returns. We also provide evidence on the risk-adjusted returns of these trading
strategies.
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A. Portfolio Formation Procedure
Besides the criteria mentioned in Section II, the companies that we include in the portfolios have to
satisfy an additional selection criterion. To be included in the portfolio formed in year t a firm must
have a nonmissing value for FR in the fiscal year ending in year t− 1 (which implies a nonmissing
price in December of year t− 1).
In July of year t the selected companies are allocated to one of eleven groups according to their
FR in December of year t− 1. The first ten groups are formed using the deciles of the distribution
of FR for underfunded firms (FR<0), while the eleventh group includes all the overfunded firms
(FR≥0). In more detail, to form the first ten groups, we use the break points of the FR distribution
of NYSE firms with negative FR. We use NYSE break points, as in Fama and French (1993), in
order to avoid lower decile portfolios being entirely populated by smaller NASDAQ companies.
The first portfolio contains the most underfunded firms, the tenth portfolio contains the least
underfunded firms, and the eleventh portfolio, which we denote OF, contains all the overfunded
firms.
We create the monthly portfolio return series by value-weighting or equally weighting the returns
of the companies in each group from July of year t to June of year t+ 1. Choosing July of year t
as the portfolio formation date ensures that the accounting information for the fiscal year ending
in year t − 1 is available to the market (Fama and French (1993)). If a company is delisted for
performance reasons, the delisting return is used if available, and then the company is dropped from
the portfolio. As mentioned above, companies for which FR is more than five standard deviations
from the annual mean are not included in the portfolios. Portfolios are reformed annually. The
available monthly portfolio returns range from July 1981 to December 2003.
Table II reports descriptive statistics on the composition of the eleven portfolios and their
returns. A thorough characterization of these companies in terms of their past earnings and other
measures of performance is provided in Section V. The characteristics in Panel A are measured in
December of t−1 relative to portfolio formation. There is wide dispersion in the average level of FR
across portfolios. For the most underfunded firms (portfolio one) the average FR is about -46%,
while for the least underfunded ones (portfolio ten) it is only about -0.1%. This portfolio therefore
includes firms for which the underfunding is effectively very small. The OF portfolio includes all
overfunded firms, and the average level of FR is 6%. The average size of the companies in the first
ten portfolios increases almost uniformly. The opposite is true for B/M, as most value firms are
in portfolio one. This observation is relevant in contrasting our findings with the value premium.
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Notice, finally, that the OF portfolio contains on average a much higher number of firms than the
other portfolios. TABLE II
HEREPanel B of Table II reports means and standard deviations for the returns of both value-
weighted (VW) and equally weighted (EW) portfolios for the 270 months between July 1981 and
December 2003. In anticipation of the main finding of this paper, we observe that the portfolio
of the most underfunded firms has the lowest average monthly returns, in spite of the highest
standard deviation, both in the VW and EW case. Notice that the low standard deviation of the
OF is possibly related to the high number of firms in the portfolio, which provides a high degree
of diversification.
Finally, Panel C of Table II provides means and standard deviations for the factors used in
the time-series regressions.8 The EXM, HML, and SMB factors are constructed as in Fama and
French (1993), and are respectively the market portfolio minus the risk-free rate, a portfolio long in
high B/M and short in low B/M firms, and a portfolio long in small and short in large companies.
The momentum factor (UMD) is constructed as a long investment in past twelve-month winners
and a short investment in past twelve-month losers; its inclusion is justified by the evidence in
Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) that past winners continue to gain extra returns over past losers
within a one-year horizon.
B. Raw Returns
Table III reports compound returns at different horizons for both VW (Panel A) and EW (Panel B)
portfolios. By looking at Panel A, we notice that in the first semester after formation (S1), portfolio
one earns a negative return of about -0.55%. The difference in returns between portfolio one and the
OF portfolio in this period is about 5.77%. The fact that the average return for the portfolio of the
most underfunded companies is negative suggests that the cause of its low returns is probably related
to mispricing; this impression is strengthened by the evidence of market surprises in Section IV.
Over the same six-month horizon, portfolios two and three also earn low returns compared to the
rest of the universe of stocks. Overall, there is nonmonotonicity in average returns with respect to
portfolio ordering, which clearly indicates that only extreme levels of underfunding produce returns
that are significantly lower. TABLE III
HEREIn the first year after portfolio formation (Y1), the difference in compound returns between the
OF portfolio and portfolio one decreases to 4.58%. Evidently, most of the return difference in year
one is produced in the first six months. Portfolio two still earns lower returns, but for this portfolio
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the difference in returns compared to the rest of the stocks tends to vanish with time. Instead, the
striking result is that the first portfolio continues to earn comparatively low returns even five years
after portfolio formation. This result acquires even more relevance when considering that firms in
portfolio one are small and value companies and as such should earn high average returns.
The situation for EW portfolios in Panel B is consistent with the evidence in Panel A. The main
difference is that portfolio one returns in the first six months are even smaller (-4.02%) and that
portfolio two also earns negative returns (-1.50%) over the same horizon. These results suggest
that underfunding is associated with comparatively lower returns in the case of smaller firms, at
least in the early period after portfolio formation.
Overall, the evidence from raw returns is consistent with the mispricing view that we propose
in the introduction. In particular, the negative returns in the first period after portfolio formation
suggest that investors are surprised by negative information. This impression is confirmed by the
analysis of returns around earnings announcements in Section IV. Furthermore, the fact that low
returns for the portfolio of mostly underfunded firms persist even five years after formation is also
consistent with our interpretation. As we mention in the introduction, ERISA imposes on severely
underfunded firms the obligation to contribute over a three- to five-year period. This implies that
the surprises will not materialize in a single moment, but rather will be spread over several periods
as amortizations and contributions affect earnings and cash flows. This gradual adjustment of
returns to pension funding information is also possible due to the persistence in underfunding: if
the underfunding was short lived or exhibited fast reversals then the sequence of surprises would
not materialize.9
C. Risk-Adjusted Returns
We point out above that underfunded companies, on average small and value companies, should
have high expected returns. Therefore, the evidence of low returns for the low FR portfolios is
not likely to be explained by risk factors related to size or B/M. However, one can formally test
that these portfolios earn low risk-adjusted returns by running time-series regressions of portfolio
returns on the returns on different factors, including the market. A priori a difference in returns
among the portfolios could be explained by different factor loadings.
Table IV reports alphas, factor loadings, and R2 of the time-series regressions
Rit = αi + biEXMt + hiHMLt + siSMBt + εit, (2)
where Rit is the portfolio excess return. The estimation sample is July 1981 to December 2003. TABLE IV
HERE.
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From Panel A we infer that returns are significantly negative once we control for the effect of
known factors. Portfolios one and two have significantly negative intercepts, both in the VW and
EW cases. For example, the VW portfolio one has a significantly negative alpha of -0.89% monthly,
which amounts to about 10.6% annually. Consistent with the results for raw returns, there seems
to be no clear pattern in the alphas beyond the first two portfolios. Notice in particular that the
alpha of the OF portfolio is not very far from zero. This result persists also when highly overfunded
companies (top decile) are isolated in a portfolio (results not reported). This evidence suggests that
the effect of the funding status is not symmetric between under- and overfunded firms. A possible
explanation for this asymmetry is provided by short-termism, which causes managers to anticipate
the gains from a surplus in the pension plan.
Panel B shows that the most underfunded portfolios not only have higher loadings on HML
and SMB, as one would expect given their size and B/M, but they also have higher market betas.
Consequently, adjusting for risk increases the wedge between the returns of the most underfunded
companies and most overfunded.
Another known pattern in returns is momentum. There is evidence that past winners tend
to outperform past losers in the following year (Jegadeesh and Titman (1993)). In Section V, we
present evidence that the most underfunded companies tend to have poor past operational perfor-
mance. A reasonable concern is that the underperformance of the most underfunded companies can
be driven by momentum. There are a number of ways to address this concern. A first reply is that
momentum is a short-lived phenomenon (Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok (1996)), whereas we
have shown that the underperformance of severely underfunded companies is long-lasting (at least
up to five years after portfolio formation). Later, in Section VI, we also control for different types
of momentum in a cross-sectional setting, and show that the explanatory power of FR survives.
Here, we include a momentum factor in the time-series regressions by estimating the model
Rit = αi + biEXMt + hiHMLt + siSMBt +miUMDt + εit. (3)
Table V reports alphas, factor loadings, and R2 for the four-factor model in Equation (3).
Although the momentum factor can account for a fraction of the alphas, Panel A shows that the
mispricing of the most underfunded portfolios is still large. In particular, the VW portfolio one
still has a very negative alpha (-0.76%), which is significant at the 5% level. Momentum seems to
have a larger impact on EW portfolios, as the alpha of portfolio one drops to -0.35%. This fact
is consistent with the evidence that momentum is more relevant among smaller companies (Hong,
Lim, and Stein (2001)). TABLE V
HERE.
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Panel B of Table V shows that the most underfunded companies have negative UMD loadings,
suggesting that these stocks behave like momentum losers. This finding is not surprising, espe-
cially in light of the evidence presented below (see Section V, and Panel A of Table VII), which
shows that the most underfunded companies have the lowest returns in the year before portfolio
formation. Given the already mentioned persistence in the degree of underfunding, it is possible
that the negative surprises, which cause the observed negative returns for underfunded firms, occur
repeatedly for a few years in a row. This fact is partly captured by a negative correlation with
the momentum factor, but has a foundation in the negative impact on earnings of the pension
liability. Overall, the evidence in Table V, together with the results we present later, suggests that
the mispricing identified by the funding level is in large part of a different nature than momentum.
A recent paper by Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) points out that stocks with high loadings on an
aggregate liquidity factor earn significantly higher abnormal returns than stocks with low liquidity
betas. These authors argue that this extra-return remunerates investors for the risk of holding
assets that have low returns, and possibly require liquidation, in periods when market liquidity is
low. We want to investigate the possibility that the mispricing of our FR portfolios is related to
the liquidity risk pointed out by Pastor and Stambaugh. We re-estimate the asset pricing models
in Tables IV and V including Pastor and Stambaugh’s spread portfolio, which is constructed as
the return on high liquidity beta stocks minus the return on low liquidity beta stocks. The results,
which we do not report to save space, indicate that the mispricing of our portfolios is only slightly
affected by the inclusion of the liquidity factor. The portfolio of most underfunded firms has a
significantly negative loading on the new factor, and its alpha is reduced by about 30% when this
factor is included in the model, but it remains significant. The highest FR portfolios have positive
and insignificant loadings, while OF loads negatively on the liquidity factor. Overall, this evidence
indicates that a large part of the returns of severely underfunded firms is not explained by Pastor
and Stambaugh’s (2003) liquidity risk.
To summarize, the evidence presented in this section suggests that the most underfunded com-
panies have persistently lower returns than companies that have a healthy funding status in their
pension plan. The difference in returns is not explained by market risk, B/M, size, or momentum.
The next step is to provide evidence of market surprises for the portfolios of most underfunded
firms.
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IV. Evidence of Market Surprises
The economic story that we believe to be behind the observed overvaluation of severely underfunded
companies is spelled out in the introduction. Here, we summarize the testable implication of this
argument.
For a number of reasons that are partly related to operating performance, and which we consider
as exogenous to this discussion, firms develop either a deficit or a surplus in their pension plan.
If managers are to some extent driven by short-term considerations, they have an incentive to
immediately recognize the pension plan surplus in the income statement of the fiscal year in which
it materializes. On the other hand, there is an incentive to postpone the recognition of a loss in
the pension liability. Nonetheless, if the loss is very large (above 10% of the maximum between
PBO and FVPA), the firm is obliged to amortize it in the fiscal year following the one in which
it materializes. The amortization of the pension loss and the contributions to the pension plan
decrease earnings and cash flows of severely underfunded companies in the year following the first
occurrence of the large underfunding.
We hypothesize that the reason why severely underfunded firms experience abnormally low
returns is that the market is surprised when the implications of the pension underfunding hit
earnings and cash flows. That is, while the market pays attention to earnings and cash flow figures
when valuing companies, it does not pay enough attention to pension liabilities.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to explore the causes of this myopic focus on earnings.
Suffice it to say that there is a consensus in the finance literature about the fact that investors
pay a disproportionate attention to earnings relative to the other items in a company’s financial
statements. For example, Chan, Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok (2004) argue that the almost
exclusive focus on bottom-line earnings is at the basis of the so-called accrual anomaly (Sloan
(1996)).
For our purpose, the relevant implication of this story is that the market surprise should be
observable around earnings announcements. If earnings in the year following the appearance of the
pension liability are lower than expected by investors, then severely underfunded firms should have
predictably negative price surprises around earnings announcements. To test this implication, we
compute price reactions around earnings announcements in two ways. One measure is simply the
cumulative stock returns in the three days around the announcement (from t − 1 to t + 1). For
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stock i in period t the cumulative return around the announcement is
CRit =
+1∑
j=−1
rij , (4)
where rij is stock i’s return on day j (with earnings being announced on day 0). We average CRit
across the stocks in the portfolio over the period under consideration (either a quarter or a year).
This measure is unadjusted for risk. The other measure is also a cumulative stock return in the
same three-day window, but the daily stock returns are adjusted for risk using the daily returns on
the three Fama and French (1993) factors. For stock i in period t the adjusted cumulative return
around the announcement is
ACRit =
+1∑
j=−1
(rij − biEXMj − hiHMLj − siSMLj) , (5)
where EXMj , HMLj , and SMLj are the day-jth returns on the three factors. We impute to
each stock the factor loadings (bi, hi, and si) of the FR portfolio to which it belongs during the
formation period. These loadings are estimated using the full sample of portfolio returns and are
the ones reported in Panel B of Table IV. The adjustment is meant to take care of the fact that the
most underfunded companies have high loadings on the market, HML, and SMB, and as such they
earn high expected returns, which could conceal the negative surprise. Again, the stock returns
around the announcements are averaged across stocks in the portfolio over the period of interest.
The second implication is that, if one forms expectations of future earnings based on past
earnings only, there should be negative surprises associated with the most underfunded firms. Con-
sequently, a consistent measure of earnings surprise is the commonly used standardized unexpected
earnings (SUE). Following Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok (1996), the assumed model for ex-
pected earnings is a seasonal random walk, and the SUE for stock i in quarter t is thus
SUEit =
eit − eit−4
σit
, (6)
where eit is quarterly earnings in quarter t, eit−4 is quarterly earnings four quarters before, and
σit is the standard deviation of unexpected earnings, eit − eit−4, over the preceding eight quarters.
The firm SUE are averaged across companies in the portfolio over the period of interest.
The third measure of earnings surprise is given by the revision in analysts’ forecasts of earn-
ings. If the implications of the pension liability are not taken into account, analysts should revise
downward their forecasts of future earnings of the most underfunded firms as the earnings release
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date approaches, and this revision should be larger than for the other companies. As in Chan,
Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok (1996), we define the revision in month t for stock i as the change in
earnings forecasts by analysts scaled by the prior month’s stock price, that is,
REVit =
fit − fit−1
pit−1
, (7)
where fit is the median I/B/E/S estimate in month t of firm’s i’s earnings for the current fiscal
year, and pit−1 is the stock price in month t − 1.10 The revisions are averaged across stocks in a
given month and then summed over the period of interest.
Each measure of surprise has some advantage over the others. For example, SUE capture
expectations over a longer period than the other two measures, however, the expectations in SUE
are based on the assumption of a specific model for earnings. Analysts’ revisions, meanwhile,
could be driven by the incentive to generate brokerage commissions or investment banking fees.
Therefore, it is worthwhile to consider the different indicators simultaneously.
Panel A of Table VI reports the portfolio cumulative returns around earnings announcements.
The most striking result is that in the first quarter after portfolio formation both portfolio one
and two have negative price reactions. This finding represents strong evidence of the market being
negatively surprised by earnings announcements, especially if one considers that the other portfolios
earn positive returns during the same period. For portfolio one the negative return persists one
year after formation, and in this case the difference in returns with the OF portfolio is statistically
different from zero. In general, the most underfunded stocks continue to have the lowest returns
around earnings announcements up to five years after portfolio formation, consistent with the
results using raw returns in Table III. TABLE VI
HEREPanel B of Table VI reports risk-adjusted returns around earnings announcements and reinforces
the impression from Panel A. Here, the difference in returns between portfolios one and OF is
significant in quarter one, in year one, and in year five after portfolio formation. Besides, in all
the periods that are considered, the portfolio of the most underfunded companies has negative
risk-adjusted returns around earnings announcements. Evidently, correcting for risk accounts for
the fact that these companies are small and value firms with high market betas.
Moving to the SUE evidence in Panel C of Table VI, we find further support for the negative
surprise hypothesis. The SUE for portfolios one and two are consistently the lowest in every period
that we consider after portfolio formation. Moreover, they are negative in the first quarter and the
first year after formation. The difference between the SUE of portfolio one and OF is significantly
18
different from zero in all periods under consideration. Furthermore, in year five after formation,
portfolio one still displays negative SUE.
Finally, Panel D of Table VI reports results using the revisions in analysts’ forecasts. Consistent
with prior evidence (Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok (1996)) the average revision is negative
across the board, suggesting that analysts tend to be over optimistic about earnings. The relevant
point is that the portfolio with the most underfunded firms displays the largest negative revision
in all periods, and the difference in revisions with the OF portfolio is most of the time significantly
different from zero. Remarkably, the result in year five is still consistent with a long-lasting effect
of underfunding on earnings and returns.
In conclusion, we believe the results on the persistence of the predictive power of FR corroborate
the conjecture that we elaborate in the introduction. In particular, given that ERISA forces
the employer to fund highly underfunded pension obligations within three to five years, these
compulsory contributions can represent another source of surprise a few years down the road.
V. Portfolio Characteristics
Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1994) argue that the value premium and the growth discount
are explained by overreaction to past operating performance. In that context, value companies
with a long history of poor earnings tend to be undervalued. On the other hand, Chan, Jegadeesh,
and Lakonishok (1996) show that firms with negative past operating performance continue to earn
low returns within a six-month horizon. They suggest that return momentum (Jegadeesh and
Titman (1993)) is at least partly due to underreaction to news contained in earnings. Furthermore,
there is evidence that the market does not understand that the part of earnings due to accruals
tends to reverse itself. Hence, high accruals are associated with low future returns (Sloan (1996),
Chan, Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok (2004)). Given these results, in order to compare the
mispricing that this paper identifies to previous anomalies, it is important to provide a description
of the companies in the FR portfolios in terms of their operating performance and other defining
characteristics. Also, looking at operating performance can indicate why these firms developed a
pension liability.
First of all, we recall that according to Table II the most underfunded companies have the
smallest size and highest B/M ratio in the universe of DB companies that we consider. Moreover,
separate results confirm that these characteristics persist at least up to five years before and after
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portfolio formation. Therefore, we can confidently describe the most underfunded firms as being
relatively small and value.
Table VII, Panel A reports average portfolio returns in different periods before portfolio forma-
tion. The goal, here, is to see whether the momentum anomaly can be related to the low returns of
underfunded companies. Indeed, we observe that in the three years before formation, the portfolio
of most underfunded companies earns the lowest returns. However, the striking finding is that in
the six months prior to formation the same portfolio earns the highest returns. As momentum is a
short-run phenomenon, this finding makes it unlikely that price momentum explains the low returns
of the underfunded portfolios after formation. This impression is confirmed by the cross-sectional
analysis in Section VI. TABLE
VII
HERE
The finding that the most underfunded companies earn the highest returns in the six months
before formation (January to June) has to be interpreted in conjunction with the evidence that their
returns are lowest between July and December of year t− 1. For example, portfolio one’s return is
about -12.4% between July and December of year t−1. We can think of two possible interpretations
of this evidence. First, it could be the case that at the end of year t− 1 investors start reacting to
the negative operating performance of severely underfunded companies (see Panels D to F of Table
VII). Then, possibly because of overreaction to poor earnings (Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny
(1994)), there is a correction of the initial negative surprise in the months between January and
June. The extent of this positive rebound is proportional to the magnitude of the initial negative
reaction. The second possible explanation has to do with tax-loss selling in December of year t−1.
Since the most underfunded companies are losers from the point of view of returns, they are the
most likely candidates for tax-loss selling by investors who seek to offset capital gains from other
stocks in their portfolios. In this view, the rebound in prices during the first months of year t
occurs because investors repurchase the stocks that they had sold in December of year t− 1.
Panel B of Table VII provides average portfolio SUE in different periods before formation. The
purpose is to see whether there is a relation with earnings momentum. In general, the first two FR
portfolios have negative SUE, consistent with deteriorating operating performance. However, the
second FR portfolio in the first six months before formation does not have negative SUE, in spite
of poor returns after formation. This fact, along with the robustness checks in the cross-sectional
analysis of Section VI and the persistence of low returns several years after formation, works against
earnings momentum as the sole explanation for the findings of this paper.
Panel C of Table VII clearly testifies to the lack of a relation between the low returns of
20
underfunded companies and the accrual anomaly. The most underfunded companies have the
lowest accruals both before and after portfolio formation. Given that low accruals are normally
associated with high returns, it is unlikely that this anomaly explains the abnormally low returns
of severely underfunded companies. The cross-sectional analysis below confirms this conclusion.
The rest of Table VII looks directly at operating and financial performance. Panel D and
Panel E consider the ratios of earnings and cash flows to total assets in different periods before
and after portfolio formation. The choice of presenting scaled levels of earnings and cash flows
is imposed by the fact that it is not possible to compute growth rates for these variables, as in
some years they are negative, even at the portfolio level. From these two panels it appears that
the two most underfunded portfolios tend to have the poorest operating performance before and
after formation. Furthermore, both earnings and cash flows ratios are lower in the first year after
formation for portfolios one and two, while this is not necessarily the case for the other portfolios.
This evidence is instructive for several reasons. First, poor past performance can be the reason
why these firms do not fund their pension liability in a timely manner and thereby develop a large
underfunding. Second, the fact that the operating performance worsens in the first year after
formation is consistent with the pension liability negatively impacting earnings and cash flows, and
corroborates our explanation of the observed low returns for underfunded companies.
Panel F of Table VII provides the growth rate of total sales for the companies in the port-
folios. Consistent with deteriorating earnings and cash flows, the sales growth rate for the most
underfunded companies is lowest in the periods before portfolio formation. Since the sales figure
is less subject to managers’ manipulation, this result is more convincing about the poor operating
performance of severely underfunded firms than the results concerning earnings and cash flows.
An important piece of evidence in Panel F concerns the periods after portfolio formation, when
the growth rates of sales for the most underfunded portfolios are not lower than those of the other
portfolios. This finding suggests that the reasons for the poor performance of earnings and cash
flows are not necessarily found in normal operations. Instead, it supports the view that the poor
performance after portfolio formation is due to the amortization of the pension liability and the
contributions to the pension plan.
Finally, the last two panels of Table VII report two different measures of company distress. In
Panel G there is Ohlson’s (1980) index of bankruptcy risk. A higher level of this index denotes
higher probability of default. Panel H reports Altman’s (1968) Z-score, which is inversely related
to bankruptcy risk.11 Both measures show that the portfolios of highly underfunded firms have the
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highest probability of default in all periods under consideration. Therefore, these companies can
be noted as relatively distressed both before and after portfolio formation.
The observation that severely underfunded companies are companies facing financial trouble
is interesting for two reasons. First, it sheds further light on why these firms develop a large
unfunded pension liability. Possibly, they fund their other obligations by expanding the pension
liability. Second, it suggests that distress may play an amplifying role on the impact of pension
contributions on company value. We discuss this issue in detail in Section VI, when we consider
alternative measures of underfunding.
In conclusion, the analysis of the characteristics of underfunded companies identifies the anomaly
presented in this paper as largely independent of previous findings. Severely underfunded com-
panies are firms with poor past operating performance and in relative financial distress. These
characteristics make them similar to value companies. Unlike standard value companies, however,
underfunded firms earn low returns. Furthermore, the poor operating performance would suggest
a connection with earnings momentum. Nonetheless, prior six-month returns do not identify the
most underfunded companies as losers. Also, unlike price momentum, which is a short run phe-
nomenon, a high level of underfunding is associated with low returns up to five years after portfolio
formation. Finally, the level of accruals would suggest that underfunded companies should earn
higher returns than the rest of the sample, which is in contrast with the evidence. These issues are
further investigated in the next section.
VI. Robustness Analysis
A. Cross-Sectional Regressions
A way to statistically test whether the predictive power of FR for returns survives when controlling
for the effect of other known sources of predictability is provided by the cross-sectional methodology
of Fama and MacBeth (1973). Following this approach, we use market beta, size, B/M, past six-
month returns, SUE, and accruals as explanatory variables in cross-sectional regressions along with
FR.
As we mention in Section II, in the case of stocks with positive FR, there could be a mechanical
correlation between FR and the B/M ratio. Thus, a positive association between FR and returns
could be a manifestation of the value premium. Even controlling for B/M in the regressions does not
solve the problem, as there could be nonlinearities in the value effect. To circumvent this obstacle,
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we let FR vary only for underfunded companies and replace the value of FR for overfunded firms
with zero. Furthermore, we create a dummy variable called FR(+) which is equal to one if the
company is overfunded. This dummy captures the premium in average returns on overfunded
companies relative to underfunded ones. In regressions of returns on the new FR and FR(+),
the estimated slope on FR is numerically equivalent to the slope from a regression in which the
original FR is the only explanatory variable and where overfunded companies are dropped from
the sample. When other explanatory variables are included in the regression, this equivalence does
not hold and a larger number of observations enhances the statistical power of the tests. For this
reason, we prefer to keep overfunded companies in the sample.
Another possibility to get around the mechanical correlation between FR and B/M is to define
the funding ratio in a different way. A possible alternative is to divide the difference between assets
and liabilities in the pension plan by total assets. Hence, we define the variable FR′ as
FR′ =
FV PA− PBO
Total Assets
(8)
Given that this new variable is not related to B/M, we can let it vary freely for both under- and
overfunded companies, without running the risk of capturing effects related to the value premium.
Moreover, FR′ provides a robustness check for the results obtained with FR.
As for the other explanatory variables, we use a firm’s market equity at the end of December
of year t − 1 to compute its B/M ratio.12 Market equity in June of year t measures firm’s size.
Accruals are computed as in Sloan (1996) using data from fiscal year t − 1. The (log of the) size,
(the log of) B/M, FR, and accruals of a company are associated with the stock returns between
July of year t and June of year t + 1. Each month a firm is associated with its SUE in the most
recent quarter and with the compounded return in the prior six months (R−6).13 14 We also need
to provide an estimate of the market beta for each company. For this purpose, we follow closely the
spirit of Fama and French’s analysis (1992). We impute to each company the beta of the portfolio
to which it belongs among the portfolios formed according to the deciles of the beta distribution.
The details of this procedure are in the Appendix.
We run a cross-sectional regression for each month in the sample. The dependent variables in
the regression for month t are stock returns between months t and t+6. The slopes are computed
as the time-series average of the monthly slopes. Given that the regressions are run at the monthly
frequency and the dependent variables are six-month returns, there is serial correlation in the
estimated slopes. This fact is taken into account by adjusting the standard error of the mean with
the Newey and West (1987) procedure. The sample ranges from July 1981 to December 2003.
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Table VIII reports the results from the cross-sectional regressions. In Panel A, the funding ratio
is measured using the combination of FR and FR(+). FR′, which is defined with total assets in
the denominator, measures funding status in Panel B. TABLE
VIII
HERE
The first two models in Panel A of Table VIII confirm known results in asset pricing. The
failure of beta to explain the cross-section of stock returns, which was pointed out by Fama and
French (1992), is very strong in our sample. The estimated relationship between beta and returns
is negative and insignificant. There is a negative relation between size and returns, but it is not
significantly different from zero. This result is consistent with the known evidence that the small
firm effect disappeared starting in the 1980s. Finally, B/M is a significant predictor of average
returns, confirming that the value effect still plays an important role.
The new evidence in Panel A of Table VIII concerns the models with FR in the regression. The
estimates in the third row show that FR is a significantly positive predictor of stock returns, even
accounting for beta, B/M, and size. The slope on the FR(+) dummy suggests that overfunded
companies as a group do not earn significantly different average returns, keeping the other regressors
constant. This result is the cross-sectional counterpart to the lack of significant alphas for the OF
portfolio in the time-series analysis. Also, it is further evidence of the asymmetric effect of the
funding status on average returns, for which we provide a possible explanation above.
The next three models control separately for the effect of accruals, earnings momentum (SUE),
and returns momentum (R−6), respectively. Each of the variables is significant and has the ex-
pected sign. The most significant is SUE. What matters is that the predictive power of FR is not
altered by the separate inclusion of these regressors. Even when the control variables are included
simultaneously in the last row of Table VIII, the funding ratio remains a significant determinant
of stock returns and the slope is unaffected. Incidentally, notice that prior six-month returns are
no longer significant, probably because the effect of this variable is subsumed by SUE. This fact
suggests that in our sample return momentum is largely explained by earnings momentum, which
is consistent with the results in Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok (1996).
Panel B reports the estimates obtained using FR′, the alternative measure of funding status.
The results are very similar to those in Panel A, both in terms magnitude of the slope on FR′ and
in terms of its significance. In addition, the slopes on the other explanatory variables are largely
unaffected by the change in the measure of funding status. Hence, the significant relation between
average returns and funding level seems to be robust to the definition of the funding ratio.
In summary, the evidence from the cross-sectional analysis confirms the significant relation
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between the funding status and average returns of underfunded companies. Also, it reinforces
the impression from earlier sections that this phenomenon is largely independent of other known
asset pricing regularities. Finally, the cross-sectional link is robust to alternative definitions of the
funding status.15
B. Analysis by Size Groups
In the introduction, we suggest that analyst coverage, and the quantity and quality of information
in general, can interact with underfunding in determining mispricing. Both financial constraints
and analyst coverage are negatively correlated with size. A natural question is then whether a
small size represents a necessary condition for mispricing. To answer this question, we look at the
returns on underfunded firms in different size groups.
Firms are independently sorted by size and FR, and value-weighted portfolios are formed from
the intersection of these two sorts. Five groups of underfunded firms are formed according to
the quintiles of FR in December of year t − 1, conditioning on negative FR values. Then, all
overfunded (OF) firms are grouped together. In addition, five groups are formed on the basis of
market capitalization in June of year t, using the breakpoints of the distribution for NYSE stocks.
The thirty portfolios are reformed in July of each year. Monthly portfolio returns range from July
1981 to December 2003.
Table IX reports alphas and factor loadings from time-series regressions of portfolio returns on
the Fama and French (1993) three factors. The main evidence from the table is that the mispricing
of underfunded firms is not just limited to the smallest firms. In fact, the most underfunded
companies in all size quintiles display negative alphas. The largest mispricing is -0.94%, for the
most underfunded portfolio in the third size quintile. This intercept slightly decreases to -0.81%
when the momentum factor is included (results not reported), and stays statistically significant.
The lack of statistical significance of the estimated alphas for the largest portfolios of severely
underfunded firms depends on the fact that they contain fewer stocks, and therefore bear more
idiosyncratic risk. Furthermore, notice that within each size group the most underfunded portfolios
have the highest loadings on the three factors, consistent with the findings in Section III. TABLE
IX
HERE
On the basis of this evidence, we conclude that small size is not a necessary condition to
determine mispricing of underfunded firms. Rather, this condition, when it interacts with high
underfunding, can magnify the mispricing.
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VII. Conclusions
In this article we examine the issue of the efficient market valuation of companies with a defined
benefit pension plan and find significant evidence of overvaluation for firms with severely under-
funded pension plans over the last two decades.
In particular, we show that the portfolio with the most underfunded firms earns low raw returns
relative to portfolios of firms with healthier pension plans. This phenomenon persists for at least five
years after the emergence of the large underfunding. Also, the risk-adjusted returns of this portfolio
are significantly negative. The magnitude of the discount in returns is around 10% annually.
We interpret this evidence as being due to investors not paying enough attention to the im-
plications of the current underfunding for future earnings and cash flows. The low returns we
predict are, in our view, a consequence of the fact that investors are systematically surprised by
the negative impact of the pension underfunding on earnings and cash flows. As the regulatory
environment allows companies to postpone the recognition of the pension liability in earnings, the
impact on returns occurs with delay relative to the first manifestation of the large underfunding.
Consistent with this interpretation, we provide significant evidence of market surprises in the
period after portfolio formation. The surprises take the form of negative returns around earnings
announcements, negative standardized unexpected earnings, and lower than average revisions in
analysts’ forecasts. Also, we document that earnings and cash flows deteriorate after portfolio
formation.
The most underfunded firms tend to be past losers from the point of view of returns and
operating and financial performance. This evidence suggests that the deficit in the pension plan
must have emerged from a difficulty for these companies to satisfy the funding requirements, which
in turn is a consequence of their poor economic performance and inability to borrow. Moreover,
the largest discount in returns seems to be associated with higher leverage. We interpret this fact
by arguing that for the most levered among the underfunded firms, the negative price adjustments
at the time of earnings surprises are larger. Given the credit constraints that most of these firms
face, cutting their cash flows to fund the pension plan causes them to give up to a larger number
of value enhancing opportunities than what they would do if they could freely borrow.
Finally, through cross-sectional analysis and other descriptive evidence, we reach the conclusion
that the overvaluation related to pension plan underfunding is independent of other asset pricing
regularities such as the size effect, the value premium, return momentum, earnings momentum,
and the accruals anomaly. Hence, we are inclined to believe that we have identified an additional
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layer of mispricing relative to the ones already known in the finance literature.
The anomaly that is documented in this work may have implications at both the corporate and
the macroeconomic levels. We mention here just a few of these implications. First, managers of
corporations may choose to behave strategically in the choice of capital structure at times when
market equity valuations fail to reflect the value of pension assets and liabilities, as our evidence
suggests. For instance, in the interest of old equity holders, managers of overvalued underfunded
companies may choose to issue equity rather than debt when raising new capital.16 Second, this
anomaly may generate inefficiencies in the allocation of resources, along the lines of the quotation
from Bulow, Morck, and Summers (1987) cited in the introduction. Third, in terms of public
finance, one may want to reassess the comparison between the U.S. pension system and other
alternatives, such as the more public-oriented systems in continental Europe. All these elements
seem sufficiently important to be addressed in future research.
In our view, the fact that the aggregate pension liability has reached the astonishing level of
$380 billion gives some urgency to the need for action on the regulators’ side. For this reason,
before concluding, we address a few policy recommendations. First, an important question that
calls for a timely reply is how much of the outstanding liability is already reflected in stock prices.
According to our interpretation of the mispricing, this issue should be addressed by assessing how
advanced companies are in the amortization process of pension losses. If companies are lagging
behind, then large price adjustments are still to be expected. Further, regulators should increase
investor awareness of the implications of pension liabilities for company value. This informational
activity would facilitate the correct market valuation of underfunded companies, and would prevent
drastic price adjustments. In summary, we believe that any reform of the current accounting system
should aim at allowing pension funding status to be reflected in a firm’s income statement without
delay or excessive discretion. This change may increase earnings and, perhaps, return volatility,
but we believe the gains in terms of information diffusion would be substantial. Such a measure
would also foster unequivocal interpretation of the impact on earnings and cash flows of a given
level of underfunding, and therefore facilitate the efficient valuation of these companies.
27
Appendix
A. Accounting Data Definitions
There are two structural breaks in the way Compustat reports pension related items. The first
break coincides with the reform of accounting standards introduced by SFAS 87, which changes
pension accounting effective for fiscal years beginning after December 15, 1986. The second break
is caused by SFAS 132, which is effective for fiscal years beginning after December 15, 1997.
For companies with fiscal years ending between 1980 and December 1986, the FVPA is set equal
to the content of item 245. For these years, we define the pension liability as equal to the present
value of vested benefits (item 243). This definition differs slightly from the PBO, as it does not
incorporate projected increases in salaries. Indeed, it corresponds to another measure of pension
obligation called Accumulated Benefit Obligation (ABO).
Starting from 1987 for most companies, and before 1987 for those companies that report it, we
define the FVPA as the sum of overfunded pension plan assets (item 287) and underfunded pension
plan assets (item 296). One change introduced by SFAS 132 is that companies are not required
to report separate items for over- and underfunded plans. Hence, for fiscal years beginning after
December 1997, Compustat collapses the FVPA and the PBO into the corresponding item that was
previously reserved for overfunded plans. After the introduction of SFAS 87 the PBO is reported
by all companies with a DB plan (item 286 for overfunded plans, and item 294 for underfunded
plans).
As we indicated above, before the introduction of SFAS 87 the available data allow us to
construct a variable that is closer to the ABO than the PBO. Hence, the series is not entirely
homogenous as our measure of the present value of future contributions corresponds to the present
value of vested benefits (item 243) up to the introduction of SFAS 87, and to the PBO afterwards.
Given that for the most part of this series the PBO is the relevant measure of pension liability,
in the text we simply label this series PBO. Results by subsamples, and other results in which we
replace the PBO with the ABO (available only up to 1997), show that the break in the definition
of the series does not seem to be crucial for the conclusions presented in the paper. All of these
results are available from the authors upon request.
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B. Betas in the Cross-Sectional Analysis
Imputing to a company the estimate of beta resulting from the available time series of returns
would cause too much measurement error because of the instability of company betas and the
amount of idiosyncratic risk. To get around this problem, we adopt a two-step procedure. In
the first step all firms in CRSP with ordinary common equity and returns between July 1976 and
December 2003 are used to compute pre-ranking betas. A firm pre-ranking beta for year t results
from a market model in which the estimation window ends in June of year t and begins at least 24
and at most 60 months before, depending on returns availability. Then, the pre-ranking betas are
sorted to determine the deciles of the beta distribution and firms are assigned to decile portfolios
accordingly. The portfolio returns are obtained by value-weighting the stock returns from July
of year t to June of year t + 1. The sample of returns on beta-sorted portfolios goes from July
1981 to December 2003. In the second step, full sample (post-ranking) betas are computed for
these portfolios, and each company is assigned the beta of the portfolio to which it belongs. This
beta is used as an explanatory variable in the cross-sectional regression. It is important to notice
that the post-ranking betas closely reproduce the ordering of the pre-ranking betas. They increase
uniformly from 0.42 for the first-decile portfolio to 1.61 for the tenth-decile portfolio. Moreover,
they are estimated very precisely; the standard errors are all below 0.04.
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Table I: Pension Plan Funding Over Time. The table reports mean, median, standard deviation,
minimum and maximum for the fair value of plan assets (FVPA), the projected benefit obligation (PBO),
and the funding ratio (FR), for all the companies that satisfy the selection criteria exposed in Section II.
There are 36,651 company-years in the sample between 1990 and 2002. For each company the funding ratio
(FR) is the difference between FVPA and PBO divided by market value of equity at the end of the year.
The FVPA and PBO are expressed in millions of dollars.
1980-2002 1980-1990 1991-2002
FVPA PBO FR FVPA PBO FR FVPA PBO FR
Mean 484.60 440.76 0.01 275.69 233.75 0.02 743.08 691.32 -0.01
Median 38.23 34.40 0.01 21.97 17.84 0.02 73.40 71.47 0.00
S.dev. 2637.39 2452.95 0.22 1518.90 1295.33 0.18 3547.86 3339.84 0.25
Min. 0.00 0.00 -9.87 0.00 0.00 -4.62 0.00 0.00 -9.87
Max. 87524.00 92243.00 5.72 46380.31 50991.40 5.72 87524.00 92243.00 2.07
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Table II: Descriptive Statistics. In July of year t, stocks with negative FR in December of year t− 1
are assigned to ten groups according to the deciles of the distribution of FR for NYSE firms. The stocks
in the first decile are the most underfunded and the stocks in the tenth decile are the least underfunded.
The firms with nonnegative FR are assigned to the eleventh group (OF for overfunded). Value-weighted
(VW) and equally weighted (EW) portfolios are formed. FR is the difference between the fair value of plan
assets and Projected Benefit Obligation in fiscal year ending in year t− 1, divided by market capitalization
in December of year t−1. Panel A reports the average of the annual averages of the FR of the companies in
each portfolio; the average of the annual averages of the market capitalization (in millions of dollars) of the
companies in each portfolio in June of year t; the average of the annual averages of the book-to-market ratio
(B/M) of the companies in each portfolio in December of year t−1; and the average of the annual number of
firms in each portfolio. The sample covers formation periods from July 1981 to July 2003. Panel B reports
means and standard deviations of the excess returns (return minus one-month T-bill rate) on the 25 size-
and FR-sorted portfolios. Panel C reports means and standard deviations for the returns on the four-factor
portfolios EXM, HML, SMB, and UMD. EXM is the excess return on the CRSP value-weighted index. HML
(high B/M minus low B/M) and SMB (small minus big) are the returns on the Fama-French factors. UMD
(up minus down) is the return on the momentum portfolio (long in past 12-month winners, and short in past
12-month losers). Percent returns range from July 1981 to December 2003.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 OF
Panel A: Portfolio Characteristics
FR -0.468 -0.115 -0.060 -0.037 -0.024 -0.016 -0.010 -0.006 -0.003 -0.001 0.065
Size 613.7 865.0 1417.9 1743.4 2355.9 2213.1 2658.8 3120.9 3555.9 5587.8 3228.2
B/M 2.07 1.44 1.12 1.03 0.91 0.88 0.79 0.74 0.69 0.60 0.92
Firms 68.3 64.5 65.2 64.8 59.7 60.4 59.7 61.4 62.7 66.0 960.4
Panel B: Returns
VW portfolios
Mean 0.42 0.56 0.69 0.88 0.83 0.85 0.60 0.81 0.79 0.57 0.62
S.dev. 7.49 6.09 5.58 4.45 4.68 4.68 5.06 5.08 5.08 5.22 4.28
EW portfolios
Mean 0.48 0.55 0.72 0.78 0.73 0.73 0.67 0.77 0.53 0.66 0.80
S.dev. 6.64 5.61 5.29 5.14 4.71 4.82 4.92 4.94 5.04 5.03 4.26
Panel C: Factors
EXM HML SMB UMD
Mean 0.61 0.43 0.06 0.86
S.dev. 4.58 3.27 3.36 4.39
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Table III: Raw Returns. In July of year t, stocks with negative FR in December of year t − 1 are
assigned to ten groups according to the deciles of the distribution of FR for NYSE firms. The stocks in the
first decile are the most underfunded and the stocks in the tenth decile are the least underfunded. The firms
with nonnegative FR are assigned to the eleventh group (OF for overfunded). Value-weighted (VW) and
equally weighted (EW) portfolios are formed. FR is the difference between the fair value of plan assets and
Projected Benefit Obligation in fiscal year ending in year t−1, divided by market capitalization in December
of year t − 1. Panel A and Panel B report compounded returns for VW and EW portfolios, respectively.
Monthly returns are compounded in the first semester (S1), and in year i after portfolio formation (Yi).
The row labelled AR gives the average annual return over the first five years after portfolio formation. The
sample period is from July 1981 to December 2003.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 OF
Panel A: Value-Weighted Portfolios
S1 -0.55 1.88 3.44 6.67 6.38 6.71 5.14 4.04 5.61 4.88 5.22
Y1 9.36 11.68 13.67 16.89 16.60 16.15 13.29 16.08 15.72 13.03 13.94
Y2 7.17 18.64 14.69 16.99 15.29 12.61 19.40 17.42 16.13 17.91 15.27
Y3 8.23 11.76 8.55 12.86 12.68 12.40 12.83 15.05 11.87 13.53 13.44
Y4 6.81 10.62 12.83 13.31 15.75 13.89 14.98 12.43 14.04 14.15 14.36
Y5 5.52 13.45 9.96 13.15 12.78 19.07 13.73 8.86 13.17 18.38 13.49
AR 7.42 13.23 11.94 14.64 14.62 14.82 14.84 13.97 14.19 15.40 14.10
Panel B: Equally Weighted Portfolios
S1 -4.02 -1.50 1.04 1.45 2.41 2.47 2.69 3.45 1.64 3.98 4.02
Y1 10.35 11.15 14.56 15.51 15.44 14.45 14.10 14.98 11.61 13.52 16.20
Y2 12.66 14.08 15.78 17.59 18.48 15.79 15.37 15.87 15.12 15.58 17.05
Y3 7.01 12.09 12.58 13.34 9.98 13.54 14.69 11.09 11.00 12.04 13.91
Y4 7.78 14.28 11.92 15.04 14.24 11.07 12.59 12.78 13.59 14.89 15.19
Y5 6.63 13.67 10.87 13.79 16.41 11.72 13.92 9.57 14.62 13.68 14.44
AR 8.89 13.05 13.14 15.05 14.91 13.32 14.13 12.86 13.19 13.94 15.36
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Table IV: Three-Factor Model. In July of year t, stocks with negative FR in December of year t− 1
are assigned to ten groups according to the deciles of the distribution of FR for NYSE firms. The stocks
in the first decile are the most underfunded and the stocks in the tenth decile are the least underfunded.
The firms with nonnegative FR are assigned to the eleventh group (OF for overfunded). Value-weighted
(VW) and equally weighted (EW) portfolios are formed. FR is the difference between the fair value of plan
assets and Projected Benefit Obligation in fiscal year ending in year t− 1, divided by market capitalization
in December of year t − 1. Panel A reports the constant (alpha) from a time-series regression of portfolio
excess returns on the three Fama-French factors, which the market excess return (EXM), the return on the
HML portfolio, and the return on the SMB portfolio. Both VW and EW portfolios are considered. Panel B
reports the slopes and adjusted R2 from these regressions. The sample period is from July 1981 to December
2003. t-statistics are reported in parentheses.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 OF
Panel A: Alphas
VW -0.89 -0.48 -0.26 0.16 0.16 0.15 -0.05 0.08 0.15 -0.01 -0.07
(-2.69) (-2.21) (-1.33) (0.86) (0.86) (0.93) (-0.27) (0.51) (0.87) (-0.06) (-1.24)
EW -0.68 -0.48 -0.22 -0.19 -0.11 -0.15 -0.15 -0.06 -0.30 -0.14 -0.05
(-2.61) (-2.51) (-1.30) (-1.10) (-0.77) (-1.05) (-0.96) (-0.45) (-2.19) (-1.14) (-0.55)
Panel B: Factor Loadings and R2
VW Portfolios
EXM 1.38 1.24 1.17 0.86 0.89 0.95 0.97 1.03 0.99 1.02 0.99
(16.94) (23.34) (24.48) (19.28) (19.43) (23.95) (21.60) (25.30) (23.65) (28.24) (76.31)
HML 1.03 0.60 0.54 0.44 0.29 0.28 0.14 0.23 0.11 -0.06 0.22
(8.21) (7.38) (7.34) (6.47) (4.19) (4.66) (1.97) (3.65) (1.73) (-1.16) (10.76)
SMB 0.35 0.29 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.04 -0.11 -0.01 -0.14 -0.29 -0.22
(3.34) (4.17) (0.55) (0.53) (0.33) (0.72) (-1.89) (-0.12) (-2.57) (-6.18) (-12.82)
R2 0.52 0.69 0.70 0.59 0.61 0.71 0.68 0.74 0.72 0.81 0.96
EW Portfolios
EXM 1.17 1.06 1.05 1.00 0.97 1.00 0.99 1.02 1.04 1.06 0.98
(18.15) (22.48) (25.53) (23.94) (26.59) (28.62) (25.98) (30.56) (30.63) (34.00) (44.81)
HML 0.89 0.77 0.60 0.72 0.52 0.54 0.42 0.41 0.39 0.31 0.53
(9.04) (10.62) (9.52) (11.26) (9.36) (10.13) (7.18) (8.00) (7.43) (6.55) (15.96)
SMB 0.88 0.78 0.62 0.67 0.45 0.48 0.40 0.44 0.40 0.34 0.34
(10.54) (12.80) (11.72) (12.43) (9.55) (10.69) (8.18) (10.11) (9.17) (8.36) (12.18)
R2 0.62 0.71 0.76 0.73 0.76 0.79 0.75 0.81 0.81 0.84 0.89
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Table V: Four-Factor Model. In July of year t, stocks with negative FR in December of year t − 1
are assigned to ten groups according to the deciles of the distribution of FR for NYSE firms. The stocks
in the first decile are the most underfunded and the stocks in the tenth decile are the least underfunded.
The firms with nonnegative FR are assigned to the eleventh group (OF for overfunded). Value-weighted
(VW) and equally weighted (EW) portfolios are formed. FR is the difference between the fair value of plan
assets and Projected Benefit Obligation in fiscal year ending in year t− 1, divided by market capitalization
in December of year t − 1. Panel A reports the constant (alpha) from a time-series regression of portfolio
excess returns on four factors, the market excess return (EXM), the return on the HML portfolio, the return
on the SMB portfolio, and the return on a momentum portfolio (UMD). Both VW and EW portfolios are
considered. Panel B reports the slopes and adjusted R2 from these regressions. The sample is July 1981 to
December 2003. t-statistics are reported in parentheses.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 OF
Panel A: Alphas
VW -0.76 -0.36 -0.18 0.25 0.11 0.12 -0.04 0.04 0.05 -0.01 -0.01
(-2.25) (-1.63) (-0.93) (1.38) (0.56) (0.71) (-0.24) (0.25) (0.30) (-0.07) (-0.26)
EW -0.35 -0.24 0.01 0.10 -0.01 0.01 0.05 0.07 -0.08 -0.03 0.08
(-1.39) (-1.30) (0.09) (0.64) (-0.06) (0.04) (0.34) (0.49) (-0.61) (-0.23) (0.90)
Panel B: Factor Loadings and R2
VW Portfolios
EXM 1.35 1.22 1.16 0.85 0.90 0.95 0.97 1.04 1.01 1.02 0.98
(16.42) (22.73) (23.87) (18.71) (19.35) (23.70) (21.20) (25.08) (23.90) (27.74) (76.67)
HML 1.00 0.58 0.52 0.43 0.31 0.29 0.14 0.24 0.13 -0.06 0.20
(7.97) (7.10) (7.10) (6.18) (4.32) (4.72) (1.94) (3.75) (2.03) (-1.14) (10.49)
SMB 0.36 0.30 0.04 0.04 0.01 0.03 -0.11 -0.01 -0.15 -0.29 -0.21
(3.45) (4.35) (0.66) (0.69) (0.25) (0.66) (-1.87) (-0.19) (-2.75) (-6.16) (-12.91)
UMD -0.12 -0.11 -0.07 -0.09 0.05 0.03 0.00 0.04 0.09 0.00 -0.05
(-1.64) (-2.30) (-1.59) (-2.31) (1.21) (0.84) (-0.09) (1.03) (2.38) (0.07) (-4.23)
R2 0.52 0.69 0.70 0.59 0.61 0.71 0.68 0.74 0.73 0.80 0.96
EW Portfolios
EXM 1.11 1.01 1.00 0.95 0.95 0.97 0.95 1.00 1.00 1.04 0.95
(17.84) (22.32) (25.71) (24.71) (26.01) (28.43) (26.01) (30.19) (31.74) (33.64) (46.09)
HML 0.83 0.72 0.55 0.67 0.50 0.51 0.38 0.39 0.34 0.29 0.51
(8.77) (10.42) (9.32) (11.41) (9.05) (9.87) (6.83) (7.67) (7.16) (6.18) (16.17)
SMB 0.91 0.80 0.64 0.70 0.46 0.50 0.42 0.45 0.42 0.35 0.35
(11.47) (13.83) (12.90) (14.28) (9.87) (11.41) (9.02) (10.64) (10.54) (8.83) (13.44)
UMD -0.31 -0.22 -0.22 -0.27 -0.10 -0.15 -0.19 -0.12 -0.21 -0.11 -0.12
(-5.57) (-5.49) (-6.18) (-7.86) (-3.00) (-4.77) (-5.70) (-4.04) (-7.42) (-3.94) (-6.34)
R2 0.66 0.74 0.79 0.78 0.77 0.80 0.78 0.82 0.85 0.85 0.91
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Table VI: Measures of Surprise. In July of year t, stocks with negative FR in December of year t−1
are assigned to ten groups according to the deciles of the distribution of FR for NYSE firms. The stocks in the
first decile are the most underfunded and the stocks in the tenth decile are the least underfunded. The firms
with nonnegative FR are assigned to the eleventh group (OF for overfunded). FR is the difference between
the fair value of plan assets and Projected Benefit Obligation in fiscal year ending in year t − 1, divided
by market capitalization in December of year t − 1. Panel A reports cumulative returns around earnings
announcements. Returns are summed from one day before the announcement to one day after, and averaged
across the stocks in each portfolio during each quarter. Then, the quarterly portfolio surprises are added to
form the cumulative portfolio surprise in the period of interest. The periods that are considered range from
one quarter (Q1) to the fifth year (Y5) after portfolio formation. Panel B reports risk-adjusted cumulative
returns around earnings announcements. Returns are relative to a Fama-French three-factor model, where
the factor loadings are the full sample loadings of the FR portfolio to which the stock belongs in that
formation period. The same aggregation procedure applies as in Panel A. Panel C reports standardized
unexpected earnings (the change in quarterly earnings per share from its value four quarters before, divided
by the standard deviation of this quantity over the previous eight quarters). The quarterly standardized
unexpected earnings are averaged across the stocks in the portfolios and then added over different periods.
Panel D reports the percentage revision in analysts’ forecasts. For each company in each month, the monthly
change in the median forecast of the current fiscal year earnings is divided by the stock price in the previous
month. This percentage revision is averaged across stocks in the portfolio in each month and then summed
over the period of interest. The periods considered range from the first semester (S1) to the fifth year (Y5)
after portfolio formation. For each panel, the last column reports the t-statistic for the test of the hypothesis
that the difference in the quantity of interest between the overfunded portfolio and FR portfolio one is equal
to zero over the sample period. The sample period is between July 1981 and December 2003.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 OF t-stat(OF-1)
Panel A: Cumulative Returns Around Earnings Announcements
Q1 -0.010 -0.007 0.002 0.002 -0.003 0.004 0.002 0.004 0.003 0.000 0.003 1.519
Y1 -0.002 0.001 0.009 0.013 0.010 0.011 0.010 0.009 0.012 0.009 0.011 2.211
Y2 0.008 0.004 0.010 0.017 0.017 0.016 0.008 0.007 0.006 0.007 0.011 0.744
Y3 0.001 0.015 0.011 0.018 0.002 0.016 0.009 0.006 0.012 0.014 0.008 0.799
Y4 0.004 0.003 0.010 0.011 0.008 0.015 0.007 0.010 0.015 0.015 0.010 0.793
Y5 0.000 0.010 0.012 0.014 0.002 0.010 0.010 0.006 0.012 0.013 0.011 1.322
Panel B: Adjusted Cumulative Returns Around Earnings Announcements
Q1 -0.004 -0.006 0.000 0.003 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 2.617
Y1 -0.010 -0.003 0.003 0.007 0.002 0.005 0.006 0.003 0.007 0.000 0.004 2.802
Y2 -0.004 0.002 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.003 0.006 0.003 0.001 0.005 0.003 0.984
Y3 -0.006 0.005 0.004 0.008 0.000 0.007 0.004 0.000 0.008 0.005 0.002 1.143
Y4 -0.009 0.000 0.006 0.007 0.001 0.012 0.003 0.008 0.001 0.010 0.003 1.919
Y5 -0.014 0.006 -0.002 0.006 -0.003 0.005 0.010 0.005 0.001 0.001 0.004 2.519
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Table VI: Continued
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 OF t-stat(OF-1)
Panel C: Standardized Unexpected Earnings
Q1 -0.076 -0.099 0.055 0.113 0.106 0.168 0.236 0.367 0.421 0.541 0.326 5.760
Y1 -0.256 -0.204 0.335 0.299 0.538 0.777 0.936 1.174 1.417 1.912 1.208 5.740
Y2 0.207 0.012 0.353 0.617 0.668 0.693 0.950 0.911 1.398 1.648 1.185 4.850
Y3 0.062 0.020 0.426 0.758 0.838 1.111 0.710 0.974 1.738 1.489 1.266 7.200
Y4 -0.157 0.260 0.140 0.898 0.699 0.653 1.010 1.040 1.236 1.700 1.139 7.509
Y5 -0.084 0.328 0.119 0.764 0.692 0.631 1.124 1.217 1.393 1.671 1.104 4.682
Panel D: Revisions in Analyst Forecast (%)
S1 -0.058 -0.033 -0.015 -0.013 -0.008 -0.010 -0.007 -0.008 -0.004 -0.004 -0.009 3.995
Y1 -0.057 -0.026 -0.010 -0.013 -0.007 -0.007 -0.005 -0.006 -0.004 -0.002 -0.005 3.034
Y2 -0.047 -0.015 -0.003 -0.008 -0.009 -0.006 0.003 -0.009 -0.003 0.003 -0.005 2.473
Y3 -0.055 -0.007 -0.010 -0.007 -0.011 -0.002 -0.001 -0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 3.442
Y4 -0.024 -0.026 -0.012 -0.008 -0.005 -0.005 -0.008 -0.010 -0.003 -0.001 -0.004 1.424
Y5 -0.068 -0.013 -0.015 -0.003 -0.002 -0.006 0.005 -0.005 -0.003 0.006 -0.004 1.993
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Table VII: Portfolio Characteristics. In July of year t, stocks with negative FR in December of
year t − 1 are assigned to ten groups according to the deciles of the distribution of FR for NYSE firms.
The stocks in the first decile are the most underfunded and the stocks in the tenth decile are the least
underfunded. The firms with nonnegative FR are assigned to the eleventh group (OF for overfunded). FR
is the difference between the fair value of plan assets and Projected Benefit Obligation in fiscal year ending
in year t− 1, divided by market capitalization in December of year t− 1. Panel A reports compound equally
weighted portfolio returns. The compounding periods range from the first semester (-S1) and to the third
year (-Y3) before portfolio formation. Panel B reports standardized unexpected earnings (the change in
quarterly earnings per share from its value four quarters before, divided by the standard deviation of this
quantity over the previous eight quarters). The quarterly standardized unexpected earnings are averaged
across the stocks in the portfolios and then summed over different periods. The periods that are considered
range from the first semester (-S1) and to the third year (-Y3) before portfolio formation. Panel C reports
the average accrual to asset ratio for the companies in the portfolio. Panel D reports the ratio of total
earnings for the companies in the portfolio divided by total assets in the fiscal year under consideration.
Panel E reports the ratio of total cash flows for the companies in the portfolio divided by total assets in
the fiscal year under consideration. Panel F reports the growth rate of total sales for the companies in the
portfolio. Panel G reports Ohlson’s (1980) measure of bankruptcy risk computed using accounting data for
the year under consideration. A higher value of this measure signifies a higher probability of bankruptcy.
Panel H reports Altman’s (1968) measure of bankruptcy risk computed using accounting data for the year
under consideration. A lower value of this measure signifies a higher probability of bankruptcy. The fiscal
years considered in all panels, except for the first two, range from the third year before portfolio formation
(-Y3) to the third fiscal year ending after portfolio formation (Y3).
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 OF
Panel A: Raw Returns
-Y3 5.66 11.56 13.64 17.34 20.69 18.82 24.96 24.76 24.25 29.84 19.12
-Y2 1.08 8.24 10.45 15.22 14.67 18.58 21.37 25.81 24.97 29.83 18.17
-Y1 6.64 11.50 13.22 12.48 16.00 16.87 14.83 20.32 18.56 19.24 17.25
-S1 21.82 15.88 14.86 12.87 14.13 12.84 9.32 11.79 10.32 10.12 12.35
Panel B: Standardized Unexpected Earnings
-Y3 -0.66 -0.15 0.29 0.81 1.33 1.10 2.07 2.26 2.45 3.83 1.87
-Y2 -0.98 -0.58 -0.02 0.51 0.82 1.01 1.55 2.13 2.49 3.35 1.50
-Y1 -0.65 -0.32 -0.08 0.12 0.43 0.77 1.18 1.83 2.00 2.85 1.26
-S1 -0.03 0.09 0.08 0.02 0.13 0.17 0.26 0.40 0.52 0.60 0.33
Panel C: Accruals
-Y3 -0.05 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03
-Y2 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03
-Y1 -0.06 -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.04
Y1 -0.06 -0.05 -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04
Y2 -0.06 -0.05 -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 -0.04
Y3 -0.05 -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04
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Table VII: Continued
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 OF
Panel D: Earnings to Assets
-Y3 0.002 0.024 0.024 0.036 0.033 0.035 0.031 0.027 0.039 0.041 0.034
-Y2 -0.004 0.014 0.030 0.033 0.035 0.035 0.033 0.034 0.040 0.039 0.033
-Y1 -0.016 0.010 0.027 0.028 0.037 0.033 0.033 0.036 0.038 0.038 0.031
Y1 -0.025 0.004 0.032 0.030 0.034 0.033 0.028 0.028 0.038 0.036 0.029
Y2 -0.001 -0.001 0.028 0.034 0.029 0.029 0.031 0.030 0.034 0.036 0.028
Y3 -0.004 0.005 0.029 0.033 0.029 0.029 0.032 0.030 0.034 0.033 0.028
Panel E: Cash Flows to Assets
-Y3 0.050 0.056 0.065 0.072 0.067 0.061 0.058 0.053 0.064 0.063 0.061
-Y2 0.045 0.046 0.071 0.070 0.070 0.062 0.060 0.059 0.065 0.060 0.060
-Y1 0.035 0.043 0.068 0.065 0.069 0.060 0.060 0.060 0.064 0.059 0.058
Y1 0.026 0.037 0.072 0.067 0.067 0.060 0.056 0.053 0.064 0.056 0.056
Y2 0.049 0.032 0.067 0.071 0.062 0.057 0.058 0.055 0.060 0.057 0.055
Y3 0.045 0.038 0.069 0.070 0.062 0.056 0.058 0.055 0.060 0.056 0.055
Panel F: Sales Growth
-Y3 0.008 0.040 0.018 0.007 0.050 0.035 0.041 0.059 0.059 0.078 0.064
-Y2 -0.002 0.034 0.049 0.030 0.055 0.052 0.076 0.139 0.119 0.069 0.058
-Y1 0.014 0.059 0.034 0.045 0.043 0.105 0.089 0.098 0.092 0.124 0.070
Y1 0.065 0.057 0.061 0.085 0.056 0.071 0.045 0.079 0.100 0.123 0.072
Y2 0.098 0.050 0.101 0.066 0.094 0.100 0.100 0.047 0.112 0.138 0.077
Y3 0.071 0.061 0.109 0.075 0.048 0.077 0.098 0.128 0.088 0.120 0.082
Panel G: Ohlson
-Y3 0.36 -0.35 -0.57 -0.69 -0.69 -0.82 -0.98 -1.05 -1.13 -1.36 -1.08
-Y2 0.61 -0.22 -0.46 -0.60 -0.54 -0.77 -0.94 -1.11 -1.12 -1.32 -1.02
-Y1 0.99 -0.04 -0.30 -0.52 -0.64 -0.67 -0.89 -1.13 -1.01 -1.33 -0.94
Y1 1.18 0.10 -0.29 -0.46 -0.56 -0.63 -0.84 -0.99 -0.86 -1.32 -0.85
Y2 1.03 0.16 -0.32 -0.48 -0.52 -0.60 -0.79 -0.88 -0.81 -1.18 -0.84
Y3 1.14 0.04 -0.28 -0.40 -0.59 -0.56 -0.60 -0.83 -0.81 -1.16 -0.83
Panel H: Altman
-Y3 1.93 2.44 2.73 2.78 2.81 3.04 3.13 3.31 3.55 4.24 3.03
-Y2 1.76 2.34 2.60 2.68 2.77 2.88 3.06 3.31 3.46 4.33 2.99
-Y1 1.43 2.15 2.44 2.56 2.63 2.77 2.96 3.35 3.35 4.35 2.92
Y1 1.37 2.10 2.45 2.54 2.64 2.76 2.93 3.15 3.22 4.07 2.86
Y2 1.52 2.16 2.48 2.59 2.68 2.76 2.84 3.08 3.08 3.85 2.84
Y3 1.53 2.30 2.51 2.47 2.70 2.72 2.71 3.09 3.03 3.66 2.84
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Table VIII: Cross-Sectional Tests. Panel A reports slopes and t-statistics (in parentheses) from
Fama and MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional regressions of six-month buy-and-hold stock returns on different
combinations of the following explanatory variables. Beta is the post-ranking beta of the beta-decile portfolio
to which a firm belongs at the end of June of year t. Book-to-Market (B/M) is the log of book value of equity
in December of year t − 1 divided by market value of equity in December of year t − 1. Firm size (Size) is
the log of market capitalization measured in June of year t. For underfunded companies, the funding ratio
(FR) is the difference between fair value of plan assets and the projected benefit obligations in the fiscal year
ending in year t−1, divided by market value of equity at the end of year t−1. For overfunded companies, FR
equals zero. FR(+) is a dummy variable which is equal to one if the company is overfunded. Accruals (Acc.)
are computed in December of year t− 1, as in Sloan (1996). SUE are standardized unexpected earnings (the
change in quarterly earnings per share from its value four quarters before, divided by the standard deviation
of this variable over all the available observations for one company) in the most recent quarter. Ret−6 is the
compound return over the past six months. In the regressions, the same level of FR, FR(+), beta, Size,
B/M and Accruals is matched with six-month compounded returns in all the months from July of year t to
June of year t+1. SUE and Ret−6 change at the quarterly and monthly frequency, respectively. In Panel B
the explanatory FR′ replaces FR and FR(+). For over- and underfunded companies, FR′ is the difference
between fair value of plan assets and the projected benefit obligations in fiscal year ending in year t − 1,
divided by total assets at the end of year t− 1. The reported slopes are computed as the time-series average
of the slopes in monthly regressions of compound excess returns on the explanatory variables for July 1981
to December 2003. The t-statistics are computed using Newey-West (1987) standard errors with five lags of
autocorrelation. The average number of stocks in the regressions is 1,252.
Panel A: FR
FR Beta B/M Size Acc. SUE Ret-6 FR(+)
-1.79
(-1.13)
-1.89 1.50 -0.07
(-0.82) (4.47) (-0.30)
7.82 -1.25 1.56 -0.08 0.02
(2.08) (-0.80) (4.76) (-0.36) (0.08)
8.12 -1.24 1.55 -0.08 -7.96 0.02
(2.15) (-0.80) (4.83) (-0.36) (-3.50) (0.08)
7.75 -1.07 1.64 -0.10 1.70 -0.01
(2.08) (-0.69) (5.08) (-0.43) (10.48) (-0.03)
7.63 -1.54 1.43 -0.10 0.03 0.04
(2.03) (-1.05) (4.23) (-0.44) (2.70) (0.13)
-1.47 1.48 -0.09 -6.48 1.62 0.02
(-0.97) (4.38) (-0.39) (-3.15) (10.73) (1.57)
7.84 -1.40 1.53 -0.11 -6.62 1.61 0.02 0.01
(2.10) (-0.96) (4.66) (-0.46) (-3.24) (10.63) (1.58) (0.05)
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Table VIII: Continued.
Panel B: FR′
FR’ Beta B/M Size Acc. SUE Ret-6
9.12 -1.17 1.54 -0.06
(2.33) (-0.75) (4.51) (-0.27)
8.73 -1.16 1.53 -0.06 -7.35
(2.25) (-0.74) (4.56) (-0.26) (-3.35)
8.75 -0.99 1.63 -0.08 1.71
(2.26) (-0.63) (4.83) (-0.33) (10.50)
8.98 -1.46 1.42 -0.08 0.03
(2.36) (-0.98) (4.01) (-0.35) (2.57)
8.45 -1.32 1.52 -0.08 -6.05 1.63 0.02
(2.24) (-0.89) (4.41) (-0.36) (-3.11) (10.75) (1.45)
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Table IX: Double Sorting: Size and FR. In July of year t, stocks are sorted by market capitalization
as of June of year t, and five groups are formed according to the quintiles of the distribution (only NYSE
stocks are used to find the breakpoints). Underfunded firms are independently sorted by the funding ratio
FR in December of year t − 1 and five groups are formed according to the quintiles of the distribution of
FR for companies with FR<0. All overfunded firms (FR≥0) are assigned to the OF group. Then, thirty
value-weighted portfolios are formed in July of year t from the intersection of the size and FR sorts. FR is
the difference between the fair value of plan assets and Projected Benefit Obligation in fiscal year ending in
year t − 1, divided by the firm’s capitalization in December of year t − 1. The table reports the intercepts
from time-series regressions of portfolio excess returns on the Fama-French factors EXM, HML, and SMB.
The table also reports the estimated loadings on the three factors. The sample is July 1981 to December
2003. t-statistics are provided in parentheses.
FR Group
Size 1 2 3 4 5 OF 1 2 3 4 5 OF
Alphas Loadings on EXM
1 -0.69 -0.31 -0.12 -0.03 -0.42 -0.02 1.08 1.00 0.96 0.99 1.00 0.92
(-3.39) (-1.85) (-0.69) (-0.18) (-2.34) (-0.15) (21.43) (24.43) (22.86) (20.22) (22.84) (37.00)
2 -0.34 -0.42 0.00 -0.32 -0.22 -0.11 1.24 1.04 0.91 1.09 1.10 0.98
(-1.36) (-1.87) (0.02) (-1.82) (-1.19) (-0.99) (20.01) (18.62) (16.50) (24.95) (23.97) (37.43)
3 -0.94 -0.49 -0.06 0.14 -0.06 -0.09 1.37 1.12 1.05 1.00 1.02 1.00
(-3.21) (-2.14) (-0.33) (0.49) (-0.29) (-0.81) (18.98) (20.08) (23.59) (13.91) (20.71) (36.80)
4 -0.59 -0.03 0.17 -0.19 -0.08 -0.18 1.32 1.10 0.93 1.09 1.02 1.07
(-1.49) (-0.15) (0.98) (-0.91) (-0.36) (-1.89) (13.64) (19.37) (22.01) (20.60) (19.45) (44.28)
5 -0.38 -0.09 0.40 0.01 0.06 -0.03 1.36 0.97 0.96 1.05 0.98 0.98
(-1.09) (-0.35) (1.83) (0.03) (0.42) (-0.46) (15.65) (14.98) (17.85) (18.39) (28.83) (68.67)
Loadings on HML Loadings on SMB
1 0.84 0.76 0.54 0.58 0.47 0.59 0.91 0.82 0.76 0.75 0.79 0.73
(10.81) (12.05) (8.45) (7.70) (6.93) (15.47) (14.00) (15.45) (14.05) (11.98) (13.88) (22.70)
2 0.78 0.76 0.61 0.52 0.39 0.60 0.68 0.68 0.58 0.64 0.47 0.49
(8.17) (8.85) (7.26) (7.75) (5.56) (14.77) (8.45) (9.40) (8.18) (11.45) (7.94) (14.32)
3 0.92 0.71 0.53 0.35 0.47 0.54 0.41 0.36 0.30 0.20 0.30 0.18
(8.30) (8.29) (7.80) (3.18) (6.19) (13.00) (4.40) (5.04) (5.16) (2.19) (4.65) (5.01)
4 0.87 0.44 0.38 0.46 -0.01 0.55 0.30 0.08 0.18 0.21 0.13 -0.03
(5.86) (5.05) (5.84) (5.69) (-0.15) (14.95) (2.38) (1.06) (3.36) (3.09) (1.98) (-0.95)
5 0.71 0.66 0.23 0.08 -0.02 0.13 -0.05 0.00 -0.17 -0.23 -0.37 -0.32
(4.95) (6.73) (2.79) (0.87) (-0.46) (5.95) (-0.40) (-0.04) (-2.51) (-3.23) (-8.54) (-17.22)
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Notes
1Although there is a large variety of employer pension programs, they are usually classified into
one of two broad types: defined contributions (DC) and defined benefit (DB) pension plans. In a
DC plan, such as a 401(k), each employee has an account in which the employer, and possibly the
employee, makes regular contributions. The employee has some degree of discretion concerning the
type of asset in which these contributions are invested. The total benefit the employee receives
at retirement depends on the level of contributions and the performance of the portfolio in which
they have been invested. In contrast, in a DB plan the benefit that the employee is entitled to
at retirement is determined by a formula which takes into account the employee’s years of service,
present and future salaries, etc. The employer must set aside funds to meet benefits at retirement.
These contributions are invested in assets at the sole discretion of the employer.
2The fundamental source of pension accounting regulation is the Statement of Financial Ac-
counting Standards number 87 (SFAS 87) issued in 1985, whose principles are consistent with
previous accounting practices.
3According to SFAS 87, the amortization period will be the average remaining service period
of active employees expected to receive benefits under the plan. If all, or almost all, of a plan’s
participants are inactive, the average remaining life expectancy of the inactive participants shall
be used instead of average remaining service.
4In computing the funding status, ERISA compares the market value of plan assets to the present
value of future pension obligations. For a plan that is less than 90% funded, ERISA requires the
sponsoring firm to make an additional contribution to the plan to reduce the funding deficiency
within three to five years. There are some exceptions, however. If a plan is over 80% funded today,
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and was more than 90% funded for the past two years, the additional contribution requirement is
waived. Furthermore, companies may request a hardship waiver or an extension period over which
to meet the normal and additional contribution requirements.
5In fact, the approach of Bulow, Morck, and Summers (1987) is somewhat different as they
take into account the endogeneity issues implied by regressing market value on variables, such as
the pension plan funding status, that are simultaneously determined with the market value itself.
These authors adopt an event study methodology, and test whether an exogenous change in interest
rates has a different impact on the market value of companies with different levels of funding in
their pension plans. However, this methodology is not suitable to conclude whether the extent to
which the market incorporates information into prices is consistent with correct valuation.
6One could see this fact simply by multiplying and dividing FR by the book value, that is,
FR =
FV PA− PBO
Book
Book
Mkt Cap
.
For a given level of the first ratio and positive FR, a higher FR corresponds to a higher B/M ratio.
We are grateful to the referee for making this point, which affected the final choice of our research
design.
7The latest aggregate data about portfolio allocation of DB pension plans, along with other
aggregate statistics on U.S. pension plans, can be found in the “Private Pension Plan Bulletin
Abstract of 1998 Form 5500 Annual Reports,” which is published by the U.S. Department of
Labor.
8The time series of the market return, HML, SMB, and the momentum factor (UMD) come from
Prof. K. French’s website, where the details on the construction of these portfolios are provided.
9Concerning this last point, we have separate evidence, available upon request, that the average
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FR for portfolio one five years after formation is still as low as -26%.
10Using a six-month moving average of the revision in Equation (7), while decreasing the number
of stocks for which we have nonmissing values, would not change the results.
11Following Dichev (1998), we define Altman’s (1968) Z-score as: Z = 1.2(working capital/total
assets) + 1.4(retained earnings/total assets) + 3.3(earnings before interests and taxes/total as-
sets) + 0.6(market value of equity/book value of total liabilities) + (sales/total assets). Ohlson’s
(1980) index is defined as: O = - 1.32 - 0.407log(total assets) + 6.03(total liabilities/total assets)
- 1.43(working capital/total assets) + 0.076(current liabilities/current assets) - 1.72(1 if total li-
abilities > total assets, else 0) - 2.37(net income/total assets) - 1.83(funds from operations/total
liabilities) + 0.285(1 if net loss for last two years, else 0) - 0.521(net incomet - net incomet−1) /(|net
incomet| + |net incomet−1|).
12Book-to-Market is computed as Compustat book value of shareholders’ equity in fiscal year
t− 1 (item 216) divided by market capitalization in December of year t− 1.
13To maximize the number of observations in this exercise, we standardize earnings surprises by
the standard deviation of all available surprises for one firm.
14Hence, to be included in our tests in July of year t, a firm needs to have a CRSP stock price
for December of year t − 1 and June of year t. The stock must also have monthly returns for at
least 24 of the 60 months preceding July of year t in order to compute pre-ranking beta estimates.
Moreover, the accounting variables needed to compute B/M, FR, accruals, and SUE must also be
available. Finally, we drop observations for which FR, B/M, size, accruals, and SUE are more than
three standard deviations away from the mean.
15We have separate portfolio results (available upon request) indicating that severely underfunded
firms still display large negative alphas, when FR′, rather than FR, is used as the sorting variable.
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For example, the alpha for the equally weighted portfolio one from the three-factor model is -0.42%
(t-statistic = -2.13). In general, the sorting by FR′ produces alphas that are smaller in absolute
value than the sorting by FR. As argued in the introduction, we impute this difference to the fact
that using market capitalization as the denominator identifies companies that are more likely to
be in a situation of financial distress, and for which there is less information diffusion, given their
smaller size. Financial distress would magnify mispricing through the effect of credit constraints.
The same reduction in cash flows, which is needed to fund the plan, may have a larger impact on
the value of a firm with restricted access to credit.
16Evidence of managers’ strategic behavior with respect to pension items is provided by Bergstresser,
Desai, and Rau (2004). Specifically, these authors show that managers alter the assumed rate of
return on pension assets in order to manipulate earnings.
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Figure 1: Aggregate pension plan funding over time. The graph reports the difference between
aggregate assets (FVPA) and aggregate benefits (PBO), for all the companies in Compustat with available
observations. The quantities are expressed in billions of dollars.
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